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ABSTRACT. This paper explores ‘awkward Antarctic nationalism’ and builds on the critical scholarship that explores
the contours and contradictions of everyday, mundane, banal and even hot polar nationalisms. The emphasis on
‘awkward’ is designed to draw attention to the resonances and affordances that are associated with Australian polar
nationalism in and beyond the Australian Antarctic Territory/East Antarctica. Using the 2016 Australian Antarctic
strategy: 20 year action plan as a starting point, it considers how bodies, ice cores and gateways are put to work in
order to address a fundamental pressure facing all claimant states. That is how to reassure domestic audiences that
claims to territory and access are safe, sovereign and secure without alienating others with whom one wishes to do
business within a particular area of Antarctica. More broadly, the paper concludes that both claimant states and non-
claimant states are rubbing up against one another in areas such as custodianship, environmental stewardship and polar
science and logistics. This has implications for how we interrogate the ideals and practices of the Antarctic Treaty.
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Introduction18
This paper is intended to be a provocation. It is in-19
spired by critical geopolitical scholarship and humanit-20
ies scholarship affecting both the Arctic and Antarctic21
(Brady 2012; Goodsite and others 2015; Salazar 2013;22
Hemmings and others 2015; Howkins 2015; Paglia 2015;23
Leane 2016; Roberts and Paglia 2016; Dodds and others24
2017). This varied body of work has been highly effective25
in showing how the imaginative resources and stories26
about Antarctica have resonated, through a variety of27
sites, objects and even affects, in public and policy-28
making arenas. Southern rim countries such as Argentina,29
Australia, New Zealand and the UK, through its overseas30
territories, have attracted some sharply focussed research31
on Antarctic nationalisms. What I think is also refreshing32
about this work is a resistance to thinking about the stable33
pre-formed preferences of actors such as the Australian34
government and a willingness to interrogate manifesta-35
tions of polar identity politics. The analysis here builds36
further on that vein of work, and explicitly addresses37
the awkwardness of being a claimant state in Antarc-38
tica. Such work has also begun to flag the role of the39
non-human in shaping material-semiotic entanglements40
with Antarctica, and the materiality of ice, water and41
air in producing, sustaining and undermining Antarctic42
nationalisms.43
Why awkwardness? As scholars such as Elspeth44
Probyn and Sianne Ngai have argued, there is some value45
to be secured by recuperating what might be thought46
of as ‘bad affects’ and/or ‘ugly feelings’ such as shame47
(Probyn 2005; Ngai 2007). For settler colonies such48
as Australia, shame might be a powerful affect in the49
sense of forcing the settler colonialist to reconsider their50
hegemonic presence. Could awkwardness be a productive51
affect? Does it, in effect, make us reflect further on52
hegemonic norms and values and how and where awk-53
wardness makes itself present? While our bodies might 54
manifest awkwardness, sites and spaces can also become 55
enrolled in expressions of awkwardness as well. One 56
obvious area of relevance to international regimes such as 57
the Antarctic Treaty System, with its consultative parties 58
and formal architecture of meetings and working groups, 59
might be when to say or not say something or where to 60
raise an issue or not. 61
Using Australia’s recent Australian Antarctic strategy: 62
20 year action plan (henceforth AP 2016) as an example, 63
the paper is intended to be an entrée and an invitation to 64
others to address other possible examples and expressions 65
of awkward Antarctic nationalisms involving claimants 66
and non-claimants. What awkwardness might also do is 67
to further the conversation about the settler politics en- 68
veloping Antarctica without predetermining outcomes of 69
such encounters. Just because one feels or exhibits shame 70
or awkwardness, however, does not mean that a more 71
progressive form of politics materialises. So confronting 72
and placing awkwardness into the foreground is not akin 73
to a proverbial magic bullet; no claims are advanced 74
here regarding palliative intervention. So if there is an 75
outer limit to awkwardness, it might reside in something 76
more modest namely an opportunity to ponder what is 77
awkward and what the corollary might be in terms of 78
comfort and ease within Antarctic nationalisms; what 79
forms and manifestations provoke awkwardness on the 80
one hand and comfort on the other hand, and how do they 81
get managed through accompanying affective economies. 82
The Antarctic Treaty and the Antarctic Treaty System, for 83
example, play a vital role in constraining, structuring and 84
facilitating Treaty parties, including the claimant states. 85
Finally, in terms of introductory framing, the timing 86
of the paper is not coincidental. Like others before me, 87
I believe that there is plenty of evidence of inflamed 88
Antarctic nationalisms and that a plethora of issues are 89
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once again generating awkwardness including living re-90
source management and marine protected areas in the91
Southern Ocean and the future status of Antarctica as a92
global resource. As we pursue further studies of Antarc-93
tic nationalisms, amongst claimants and non-claimants94
alike, we will need to place our analyses into context.95
For example, the politics of labelling and interchanging96
East Antarctica with Australian Antarctic Territory is97
a relatively new innovation in Australian polar policy98
discourse but the invocation of ‘gateway’ is not. Earlier99
Australian governments and authorities have made claims100
regarding Hobart and indeed Australia more generally as101
a ‘gateway state’ (Dodds 1997).102
The Australian example103
The specific object of concern to this paper is a rather104
stilted (at least in my opinion) April 2016 press con-105
ference by the Australian Environment Minister, Greg106
Hunt, on the subject of the AP (Fig. 1.). Hunt made107
some important claims about Australia’s relationship to108
Antarctica, and the vision that the Australian government109
under the leadership of Malcolm Turnbull has for its110
future. The Environment Minister, warming to his theme,111
declared, ‘And as part of that vision, we want to be the112
world leading gateway to the Antarctic. And Hobart is113
the gateway to the Antarctic for the future. That’s what114
we are seeking to do and that’s what we are setting out115
as part of this process’. His references to Hobart and its116
future role were intended to placate others who had ru-117
minated over the funding, scope and vision underwriting118
Australia’s plans for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean119
in the future (for example, Bray 2016).120
In the course of his public presentation (about seven121
minutes), the minister never mentioned that Australia122
claims 42% of the polar continent; rather than mention123
the word ‘claimant’ he picked the word ‘custodian’ and124
sought refuge with the expression ‘along with others’. As125
he stated, ‘we [Australia] are custodians of the Antarctic126
along with others, as an original signatory of the Ant-127
arctic Treaty . . . Beyond the interests of environment and128
science, we also have the great tasks of national security,129
and a peaceful cooperative Antarctica is a critical piece130
of a peaceful cooperative Southern Ocean, and if we have131
a Southern Ocean which is free of strategic competition,132
then Australia is safer and the costs for Australians are133
dramatically lower’ (Ministerial presentation for the AP134
2016). In his foreword to the AP, the Prime Minister135
observed that, ‘A strong and effective Antarctic Treaty136
is in Australia’s national interest’ and that he hoped137
the country would be ‘ . . . a partner of choice in East138
Antarctica and to work even more closely with other139
countries within the Antarctic Treaty System’ (AP 2016140
and see Fig. 2.). But again he does not mention that141
Australia is a very large claimant state. Ultimately, both142
men thought that ‘a new era of Australian endeavour’143
was being articulated in the AP. It would have been144
‘awkward’ perhaps to mention a word like ‘claimant’ and145
note the use of the geographical term ‘East Antarctica’. 146
Henceforth, this paper deliberately uses the combination 147
Australian Antarctic Territory/East Antarctica because I 148
want to draw attention to its awkwardness. 149
While others have addressed the actual details of the 150
AP, relating to infrastructure, science, gateways and Aus- 151
tralia’s role in the Antarctic Treaty System (for example 152
Bergin 2016), my focus is on how it might be indicative 153
of an ‘awkward nationalism’. Australian historian Tom 154
Griffiths’ elegant account of his voyage to Antarctica 155
on the 100th anniversary of the 1911–1912 Mawson 156
expedition inspired this investigation. He invokes well the 157
materiality of Antarctica (the ice, the winds, the cold) and 158
the symbolism of the place (the hopes, dreams and desires 159
of those who went there and those who helped to induce 160
others to go there). He links up well in other words with 161
contemporary humanities scholarship on Antarctica. But 162
then there comes a point in the article when he appears 163
to realise that he is enrolled in an ongoing sovereignty 164
project. The writing becomes ‘awkward’ almost coy in 165
its explanation of the role of his body, his presence and 166
his actions: 167
In my history of Antarctica, Slicing the silence, I 168
made a bit of fun of proclamation ceremonies in front 169
of audiences of Adélies on windy, remote Antarctic 170
coastlines. After all, claiming something as slippery 171
as ice is laced with comedy, and narrow nationalism 172
appears inapt on a continent of ice where just be- 173
ing human is so marginal and vulnerable. There’s a 174
slightly irreverent chapter in my book called Planting 175
flags. And now, in January 2012, I was suddenly in- 176
volved in the ritual myself . . . Why would Australians 177
today raise the flag in this international place? There 178
is no doubt that by doing so we are quietly affirming 179
Australian sovereignty over 42 per cent of Antarctica 180
and that the penguins are not the only creatures with 181
a colony here. But this was also a deliberately modest 182
ceremony. No anthem was sung, no cheers called for, 183
no proclamation made, no mention of ‘territory’ by 184
the prime minister, and the emphasis of the speeches 185
was on the science of the Australasian Antarctic 186
Expedition and its continuities with the scientific 187
priorities of the Treaty era (Griffiths 2012, emphasis 188
added). 189
As a reader, it is jarring. The idea that one would 190
be ‘suddenly involved’ seems odd given the length of 191
planning and effort involved in the 2011–2012 com- 192
memorative voyage. The title of his article is anything 193
but modest ‘Thus began the Australian occupation of 194
Antarctica’. How one can make ‘a bit of fun’ is also 195
intriguing – would it have been too rude if one had made 196
a ‘lot of fun’ at the idea of a group of Edwardian era 197
men cheering a flag being raised on a remote spot in 198
Antarctica? (compare Collis 2004). Pace Griffiths, I think 199
absence and modesty speak quite ‘loudly’ about Aus- 200
tralian ambition: it is something instead to be carefully 201
engineered and crafted. Here appeared to be a group of 202
people preaching a stern and considered dedication to 203
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science that has been sanctified by rituals, sacred texts,204
and even in the case of the British explorer Robert Scott205
and his party a sense of sacrifice (a fate that Mawson was206
lucky to escape). ‘Deliberate modesty’ seems awkward207
because it is forced.208
Griffiths’ visit coincided with 100th anniversary cel-209
ebrations of the Mawson expedition. For this, there was210
a plethora of documentaries/news stories released on211
Australian television channels, and a flotilla of boats212
led by the polar vessel Aurora Australis sailed along213
the Derwent River in Hobart, as part of a reconstruc-214
tion of the original Mawson journey from Tasmania to215
Antarctica. In that commemorative context, I was struck216
by Griffiths’ assertion that modesty was secured by not217
doing certain things. As if to suggest that it would have218
been truly ‘awkward’ even ‘tacky’ if he and his party219
had sang an anthem, cheered loudly, mentioned the word220
‘territory’ and made a new proclamation. Instead, in his221
judgement this was avoided because the party just spoke222
about Australian historical and scientific engagements223
with Antarctica: a set of stories about heroic white men224
going about their proverbial business some a hundred225
years ago.226
My reaction to the article was affective and visceral.227
It made me think that it was all very odd and maybe228
more so because of Antarctica’s intersectional histories229
of human encounter in which white men have often230
taken to performing on the ice (for example Bloom231
1993; Glasberg 2012). I am using ‘awkward’ in the way232
that American cultural critic Todd Reeser (2011) uses it233
in his exploration of the affective politics of ‘awkward234
masculinities’, when the normative and hegemonic model235
of masculinity (for example heterosexual, white, able-236
bodied) is challenged, scrutinised and or undermined.237
Awkward as a term implies discomfort and squeamish-238
ness and, in the spirit of Sara Ahmed’s feminist work,239
provokes us to consider how an array of things, words and240
practices can and do disrupt hegemonic norms, values,241
practices and performances associated with hegemonic242
masculinities (akin to a ‘comfort zone’). As noted in243
her The cultural politics of emotion, hetero-normativity244
‘functions as a form of public comfort by allowing bodies245
to extend into spaces that have already taken their shape’246
(Ahmed 2007: 148). She uses the example of the chair,247
and how the chair moulds around the sitting body and248
over time repeated acts of sitting leave an ‘imprint’ on the249
chair’s material. Scaling up she contends that social space250
for some people is like a chair, which can be normalised251
in so far that one barely notices it as an object with a252
particular design and associated affective properties (for253
example ‘comfortable’ and/or ‘relaxing’). The moulded254
chair can also be uncomfortable for others who try to sit255
in it thereafter. Or as David Day concluded, ‘ . . . Australia256
can take some comfort from the existence of Mawson’s257
carefully preserved hut at Commonwealth Bay. Whatever258
the Russians might do, the hut was a potent reminder259
that the Australian involvement with the territory had260
preceded that of the Russians by several decades’ (Day261
2012: 522, my emphasis). But it is not quite clear how 262
far ‘some comfort’ might extend; comfort in the fact 263
that the hut is preserved, in the fact that the Russians 264
would have to at least acknowledge a prior Australian 265
presence or in the fact that is was a potent, as opposed 266
to a feeble, reminder even though it might not be enough 267
to prevent anything the Russians want to do. Day is, of 268
course, referring to the important Russian activities in 269
the Australian Antarctic Territory during the International 270
Geophysical Year and after. 271
Contemporary Australian Antarctic scholarship is of- 272
ten quite quick to skate over awkwardness. There is a 273
general consensus that Australia manages its claimant 274
status competently and that the Antarctic Treaty System 275
works well for this particular claimant. But instead of 276
skating over things, I am going to pause and focus on 277
awkwardness. There is, after all, a trade-off between be- 278
ing assertive and confident about one’s claim at the same 279
time not being déclassé. Seven claimant states (Argen- 280
tina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand and 281
UK) make claims to the Antarctic but the vast majority 282
of the international community does not recognise those 283
claims. The terms and conditions imposed by the 1959 284
Antarctic Treaty and associated legal instruments call 285
for abeyance and restraint. But I also think it demands 286
forms of modesty even deferment for claimant states in 287
particular, in which judgments have to be made about 288
when and where to engage with others. This can and 289
does provoke feelings of awkwardness. As Matt Ben- 290
well shows in his work on Argentine polar nationalism, 291
sometimes national governments can resort to ‘blatant’ 292
displays of territorial sovereignty and strategic interest, 293
which might bring comfort to some and awkwardness to 294
others (Benwell 2014). To return to the Ahmed analogy, 295
claimants want to make a strong imprint on the ‘chair’ but 296
they can never entirely relax given the views and actions 297
of others. 298
Using Ahmed’s analogy, the imprint of claimant states 299
on the ‘Antarctic chair’ has had to endure other forms 300
of imprinting. Other bodies, infrastructures, place names 301
and interests have established themselves. Access, in- 302
spection and freedom of movement across the region are 303
the demands of the Treaty. By deliberately not aligning 304
themselves with the claimants and their visions of na- 305
tional territory, the non-claimants such as China and India 306
and semi-claimants such as the United States and Russia 307
have found ways to disrupt and unsettle the wellbeing 308
of claimant states. As we know the Antarctic Treaty is 309
in essence a device designed to manage unease, even 310
squeamishness, about who owns Antarctica but how you 311
put that into practice is demanding. Knowing when and 312
where to articulate your sovereignty and security interests 313
is problematic. Sometimes one might have to turn to 314
objects like ice, ships and dead Antarctic explorers to do 315
explicit sovereignty labour. On other occasions, words 316
like ‘stewardship’ and ‘leadership’ might suffice and 317
hopefully resonate with audiences. Walton and Dudeney 318
(2012) provide a simple example when they assert that 319
4 DODDS
Fig. 1. Environment Minister Greg Hunt announces the
2016 Action Plan
Source: https://twitter.com/ausantarctic/status/
725167639320895489
Antarctic Treaty leadership is equated with scientific320
prowess; a relationship that appears awfully, rather than321
awkwardly, convenient for claimant states like Australia322
and the United Kingdom. Elsewhere, claimant states have323
made a virtue out of their geographical proximity to324
Antarctica, seeking to earn money and establish influence325
through the promotion of polar tourism, and by advoc-326
ating collaboration in logistical/scientific matters usually327
with major non-claimant and semi-claimant states. Terms328
like ‘gateways’ are the lingua franca in Argentina, Chile,329
Australia and New Zealand (for example with regard to330
tourism, Hall 2015) and ‘gatekeeping’ is an important331
element for these claimant states.332
My interest in ‘awkward Antarctic nationalism’ is333
underscored by a concern for how nationalism works on334
an affective register. A recent paper exploring Australian335
Antarctic sovereignty makes this point discreetly, ‘Aus-336
tralia claims sovereignty over almost 6 million km2 of337
the Antarctic continent. The Australian Antarctic Ter-338
ritory (AAT) is not widely recognised internationally.339
Antarctic Treaty Article IV does not extinguish or di-340
minish Australia’s claim. Article IV does not prevent341
Australia, for example, from explicitly discussing the342
AAT in domestic politics. Discussing enforcement of343
Australian domestic law in the Southern Ocean, de-344
fending the territorial claim and other emotive issues345
related to Antarctica requires some sensitivity to broader346
international diplomacy’ (Hodgson-Johnston 2016: 183,347
emphasis added). The words ‘emotive’ and ‘some sens-348
itivity’ are for me noteworthy. But how to demonstrate349
‘some sensitivity’ while avoiding a ‘lack of sensitivity’?350
And what are those ‘other emotive issues’?351
Australian ministers responsible for announcing and352
delivering on the AP hoped and expected that the promis-353
sory note of ‘action’ would function as a form of affective354
labour. In Michael Hardt’s terms, affective labour is a355
reproductive process in which awkwardness and unease356
can be managed even banished when it comes, in this357
case, to protecting even enhancing Australia’s status as358
Fig. 2. Front cover of the 2016 Action Plan (with the
distinctive and long established identification of Australia
and Antarctica on a tilted globe)
Source: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/about-us/antarctic-
strategy-and-action-plan/20-year-action-plan
claimant state (Hardt 1999). Like a flight attendant reas- 359
suring passengers about inflight safety, ministerial figures 360
and academics alike engage in forms of ‘affective labour’, 361
as they seek to assure citizens/readers that Australia’s 362
claim to 42% of the polar continent is ‘defended’. My 363
reference to Minister Hunt’s apparent awkwardness then 364
is an entry point into both affective and counter-affective 365
labour, when the very unease and anxiety that things like 366
APs are supposed to mitigate do not resonate in quite 367
the way that was imagined. Just because you do not say 368
certain things, it does not guarantee that ‘awkwardness’ 369
is managed let alone dissipated. Like chronic pain it 370
is something that needs constant attention even if it is 371
something that one might want to wish away. 372
Hardt’s point about ‘affective labour’ helps us better 373
understand what forms ‘awkward Antarctic nationalisms’ 374
might take. Objects like fictional novels, press releases, 375
public statements and action plans contribute to the 376
geopolitical cultures of Antarctic claimant states such as 377
Australia. They not only represent those interests but they 378
also operate within affective economies, which induce, 379
provoke and circulate fear, dread, hope and comfort. 380
They challenge us to think about the role of affective 381
labour in reinforcing the foundational ideals and practices 382
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Fig. 3. Hobart as Polar gateway
Source: https://twitter.com/cain_train71/status/
725286998131372032
of the Antarctic Treaty System operating in a world in383
which an array of countries working at the intersection384
of science, economics and stewardship (in fields such385
as biological prospecting and fisheries management) are386
vastly different to those imagined in the 1950s and 1960s.387
Awkward Antarctic nationalism: geopolitics,388
sovereignty and (counter) affective labour389
Over the last twenty years, a number of scholars have390
written about Antarctic nationalism and explored how391
and why nation-states have sought to engage and embrace392
their Antarctic territories. From a traditional geopolitical393
perspective, Jack Child was a pioneer of a strand of394
research that considered how South American military395
authors in the main used articles, books and maps to ar-396
ticulate a ‘South American Antarctic’ and in particular to397
advocate a view of Argentina and Chile being materially398
connected to the Antarctic continent (Child 1985, 2008).399
In that sense geo-politics might be more appropriate400
rather than the portmanteau term geopolitics, because401
the Argentine and Chilean writings of South America’s402
relationship to the Antarctic were underwritten by the403
material intersection of South American and Antarctic404
rock, sea and ice. In the late 1970s, the corporeal also405
became another register to naturalise those connections406
further as Argentine and Chilean children were born407
and raised in Antarctica. The material and corporeal408
are important to what Michael Billig terms expressions409
of ‘banal nationalism’, where along with language (for410
example ‘our territory’) and practices (for example the411
waving of a flag) the nation-state reproduces itself (Billig412
1995; Benwell 2014).413
In Antarctica, the relationship between the corpor-414
eal and material has been essential to expressions of 415
polar nationalism. Claimant states such as Australia, 416
Britain and New Zealand invest heavily in their historical 417
and geographical records of explorers and exploration. 418
They along with other claimant states have accumulated, 419
archived and harvested Antarctica for its rocks, wildlife, 420
ice, bones, eggs and other artefacts. Scientific relics be- 421
came objects of national veneration (Roberts 2011). They 422
have registered their presence through infrastructure and 423
used museums, libraries and public spaces to record 424
and represent their polar heritage. Rock, plant life and 425
ice have been powerful accomplices to the meaning- 426
making practices that underscore Antarctic nationalisms. 427
Soil samples, bones and blocks of ice have been moved 428
from Antarctica and transported elsewhere. In Chile, for 429
example, blocks of ice were carefully preserved and 430
moved to the 1992 EXPO in Seville (see Korowin 2010), 431
in a gesture that was seen by some scholars as indicative 432
of a democratic Chile eager to articulate a vision of 433
the country very different to the military dictatorship of 434
Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989). The ice was intended to 435
exemplify the natural beauty of Chile (including Chilean 436
Antarctic Territory) and allow for a new form of place 437
branding. Henceforth, Chile would (it was hoped) be 438
thought of as a safe tourist attraction open to international 439
business and investment. 440
More recent scholarship has interrogated the as- 441
semblage of Antarctic nationalisms (more generally, Sas- 442
sen 2008; Delanda 2016), by which we mean the ob- 443
jects, the practices, the sites and spaces, the ideas and 444
the bodies involved in its genesis and reproduction. As 445
assemblage, it draws attention to the national-sovereign 446
labour and to the elements including objects and stuff 447
involved in its construction and reproduction (Salter 448
2015). Work in matters of assemblage neither prioritises 449
particular actors (human, non-human, environmental) nor 450
does it assume a pre-given scale of analysis and direction 451
of travel. Christy Collis’s examination of the British- 452
Australian explorer Sir Douglas Mawson’s expedition to 453
Proclamation Island in 1930, for example, ruminated on 454
the role of male bodies, flags and plaques, international 455
law and sovereignty performances involved in making 456
Australian Antarctic Territory (Collis 2004). In another 457
publication, Collis explored the awkward politics of mas- 458
culinity, and the manner in which the fit, active hetero- 459
normative male body was imagined to be an essential 460
accomplice in the making and reproduction of Australian 461
Antarctic sovereignty (Collis 2009). As the AP itself 462
acknowledged, the men attached to the expedition estab- 463
lished bases, travelled great distances and flew flags but 464
those achievements and performances did not make Aus- 465
tralia’s occupation of Antarctica straightforward. They 466
surveyed and mapped, and endured the very worst po- 467
lar weather imaginable and the mobility of the men 468
was always essential to the settler colonial project. As 469
Collis articulated, ‘Imperial spatiality involves motion: 470
explorers trudge ever further into continental interiors, 471
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leaving behind them flags and cairns of possession.472
Colonialism, however, involves the subsequent practice473
of spatial possession by occupation: the construction of474
settlements and the occupation of imperially claimed475
space. In Australia, as elsewhere, colonial spatiality is476
explicitly gendered as feminine, while imperial spatiality477
remains a masculine preserve’ (Colllis 2009: 515). Her478
work chimed with critical scholarship on Australia’s in-479
terior colonialism and the gendered regime of settlement,480
exploration and mobility more generally (for example,481
Hains 2002).482
Alan Hemmings and colleagues have, in a number483
of publications, explored the contours and formations484
of Antarctic nationalism, noting how challenging it can485
be for claimant and non-claimants alike to develop,486
project and circulate nationalisms in which the object of487
concern (Antarctica) is geographically remote and even488
culturally marginal to many metropolitan territories and489
societies (Hemmings and others 2015). They warn us that490
if Antarctic nationalisms go unchecked then there is a491
danger that the delicate political-legal order, as embodied492
by the Antarctic Treaty and associated legal instruments,493
might be imperilled if signatories and other parties start to494
associate nationalism with territorial and resource-based495
exploitation and competition. From my point of view,496
their work considers the foundations for Antarctic na-497
tionalism. They identify over ten bases upon which Ant-498
arctic nationalism might materialise and they range from499
legal instruments and declarations and national identity500
politics to infrastructure and public culture. Resources501
clearly matter as do regional and global rivalries and502
historic associations with the Antarctic. Their analysis503
is very helpful in setting out the diverse settings and504
forms that Antarctic nationalism might take. Without505
explicitly using the schema of Michael Billig’s banal506
nationalism (Billig 1995), one can imagine how those507
bases could contribute to the production and reproduction508
of not just banal and everyday nationalisms but also ‘hot509
nationalism’, a nationalism that takes us more closely to510
conflict and disorder. For the most part, the Antarctic na-511
tionalisms identified by Hemmings and colleagues pivots512
around the banal, the taken-for-granted and the mundane513
(Hemmings and others 2015).514
Building on that critical Antarctic nationalisms lit-515
erature, the paper ties together the material and the af-516
fective, associated with those nationalisms. In Australia’s517
delimitation of outer continental shelves, for example,518
rock samples played a crucial element in assembling519
the evidence needed by the UN body the Commission520
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) but so521
did an administrative decision taken by the Australian522
government. In order to avoid awkwardness with the523
wider international community, the materials pertaining524
to the AAT were held back from formal consideration by525
the CLCS (Oude Elferink 2008, 2013; Press 2012). The526
decision was in effect a form of affective labour designed527
to reassure international audiences that Australia was a528
‘modest’ claimant. Anticipating the reaction of others529
is not always straightforward however. The sudden and 530
temporary upheavals and unsettlement caused by the 531
mere mention of words like ‘China’ can and do un- 532
settle members of the Australian Antarctic communities. 533
Sometimes the fictional world can do that sort of unset- 534
tling work rather well. The Australian novelist Louisa 535
Larkin’s 2012 polar thriller Thirst, imagines a Chinese 536
military organisation attacking an Australian research 537
station (named Hope). What’s intriguing is how many 538
Australian reviewers simply glossed over the geopolitical 539
premise of the novel while the novel ran into difficulty 540
with the Chinese censors. Were the reviewers simply 541
assuming that, although fictional, the premise itself was 542
not outrageous? Maybe the sudden twinges and even 543
‘gut feelings’ that some might feel regarding the need 544
for Australia to do more to protects its sovereignty and 545
interests are rooted in this taken-for-granted geopolitical 546
imagination of an Australia vulnerable to powerful Euro- 547
Asian others: Russia, India and China. 548
Australia’s Antarctic 2020 AP and the Australian 549
Antarctic Territory: bodies, cores and proximity 550
In an earlier paper with Alan Hemmings, we identified 551
an inclination for what we termed ‘frontier vigilantism’ in 552
some Australian commentators when discussing the chal- 553
lenges and opportunities facing the Australian Antarctic 554
Territory/East Antarctica (Dodds and Hemmings 2009 555
and the response by Bergin and Haward 2009). Using a 556
2007 report issued by the Australian Strategic Policy In- 557
stitute (ASPI) entitled Frozen assets: securing Australia’s 558
Antarctic future, we argued that there was a tendency 559
to imagine and represent the AAT as a vulnerable and 560
feminised space, at the apparent mercy of external parties, 561
including China. Throughout the report, the authors of 562
that report appeared to us at least to be calling on the then 563
Australian government to do more; to invest more, to care 564
more and to stop being complacent. 565
Invoking a form of polar ‘Orientalism’, we argued that 566
some Australian commentators represent the AAT/EA as 567
being at risk of ‘penetration’ and we argued, controver- 568
sially, that the report was shot through with gendered 569
language and analogy. As many critics have noted, in- 570
cluding Susan Sontag, analogy and metaphor perform 571
important discursive and affective labour, their usage 572
can provoke us, reassure us, anger us and please us 573
(Sontag 1978). While we can argue over who or what the 574
‘us’ represents, these linguistic devices are tied up with 575
affective economies. The 2007 report was not intended 576
to reassure readers rather it was intended to provoke, 577
to unsettle even scare the Australian federal government 578
into taking action. 579
This trend to articulate China as a troubling ‘presence’ 580
continues to this day with another commentary published 581
in the ASPI’s magazine The Strategist warning that: 582
China has developed a presence in the Antarctic 583
through the establishment of four research stations, 584
three of which are located in the Australian Antarctic 585
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Territory (AAT). China has already bestowed Chinese586
names on 359 sites on Antarctica. Notably, China’s587
Kunlun () research station, which opened in588
Australian territory in 2009, is located 7.4 kilometres589
from Dome Argus Dome A, close to the centre of590
the continent—a demonstration of China’s commit-591
ment to Antarctica. Meanwhile, budget constraints592
placed on the Australian Antarctic Division have593
meant that Australia doesn’t possess the resources or594
equipment to develop a research base in this area.595
Moreover, China’s newest base, the Taishan (596
), which opened in 2014, is also located in the597
AAT . . . Australia has benefited from Antarctic co-598
operation from Antarctic research cooperation with599
its Chinese counterparts, but we must prepare for a600
possible future where national interest trumps friendly601
cooperation (Slevison 2016).602
For cooperation with China, as we shall note, at least603
one analyst surmises that Australia’s northern neighbour604
cannot be trusted. We might say that this is indeed awk-605
ward, as multiple commentators in Australia complain606
that the country has been too slow, too miserly and607
too disorganised with its Antarctic and Southern Ocean608
strategic and scientific planning. The ASPI is strongly609
associated with the Australian Department of Defence610
and the 2016 Defence White Paper (Australia Depart-611
ment of Defence 2016). The White Paper notes, ‘The612
Australian Antarctic Territory faces no credible risk of613
being challenged in such a way that requires a substantial614
military response for at least the next few decades. It615
is in our interest to work with like-minded countries616
to prevent any militarisation of Antarctica, which could617
threaten Australia’s sovereignty over the Australian Ant-618
arctic Territory and its sovereign rights over its offshore619
waters. Australia is a strong supporter of the Antarctic620
Treaty System, which expressly prohibits any mining621
in Antarctica’ (Australia Department of Defence 2016:622
54). The report does not make clear who would be623
non ‘like-minded’ because presumably that would have624
been awkward. The reader is left to speculate and might625
reasonably conclude that ‘like-minded’ is a shorthand626
term for western countries like the US, Norway, New627
Zealand and the UK.628
In the AP published some nine years later by the629
Australian government, not by a policy think tank, the630
tone and substance is rather different. While Frozen631
assets was a work of advocacy, the AP is the product of632
that underlying culture of advocacy and action. Before633
its release, the Australian government commissioned a634
review of Australian polar activities, led by the former635
Australia’s Antarctic Division director Tony Press, which636
led to the 2014 20 Year Australian Antarctic strategic637
plan. In his judgement, Australia only has a ‘narrow638
window of opportunity’ to act. As he contends, Australia639
must match its Antarctic aspirations with clear demon-640
stration of presence and leadership in the Australian641
Antarctic Territory. Australia should become the partner642
of choice in East Antarctic logistics and science’ (Press643
2014). The report invokes both Australia as a claimant 644
state (underlined by a black and white photograph of 645
men—not all of them Australian it should be noted— 646
waving their hands as the flag is raised over a base at Cape 647
Denison in 1912) and as geographical partner of choice to 648
others who want to work in East Antarctica (using maps 649
of East Antarctica to show the location of other countries’ 650
scientific stations). 651
The 2016 AP builds on the Press review of 2014 and 652
pivots around the idea that Australia’s claimant status can 653
be better protected by a programme of long-term invest- 654
ment and development on the one hand and on the other 655
hand by using its geographical proximity and Hobart 656
as hub to its commercial and geopolitical advantage. 657
In his assessment of the Press review, Anthony Bergin 658
reminded his readers that there were some ‘awkward’ 659
things that needed to be borne in mind, ‘But the Press 660
review presents some cold facts: new Antarctic players, 661
such as China, India and South Korea, are increasing their 662
investments in Antarctic logistics and science. China has 663
a new icebreaker and more stations in our territory than 664
we do, two of which are new. In contrast to the Chinese, 665
our Antarctic infrastructure is old and tired. While the 666
recent commitment to a new icebreaker to replace the 667
ageing Aurora Australis is a significant investment, the 668
review finds that increased resources are necessary to 669
strengthen our presence in Antarctica and modernise our 670
bases’ (Bergin 2014). Rather than reassure his readers, 671
Bergin raises the prospect of an ‘Antarctic cold rush’, a 672
potential scramble to fish more, to prospect biologically 673
more, and to send more tourists to the region all to the 674
potential detriment of Australia’s sovereignty. He identi- 675
fies other things that might resonate with the Australian 676
public at the end of his article, ‘Australia is rightly proud 677
of its history in Antarctica and the story of Douglas 678
Mawson, geologist, explorer and hero, still resonates’ 679
(Bergin 2014). It is his use of the word ‘resonates’ 680
here that I want to probe further as we consider why 681
‘resonating’ matters. 682
In Antarctic nationalisms, the role of resonating is 683
critical. Antarctic ambitions need be contagious, trav- 684
eling long distances to connect certain individuals and 685
communities with geopolitical ideologies. In other words, 686
politicians and publics alike must resonate with Antarctic 687
policies in spite of its physical distance. The stories 688
associated with Mawson are important because they per- 689
form a form of affective labour compared to a detailed 690
policy-orientated report by Press. Is it also about creating 691
imaginative geographies and histories removing physical 692
distance through imaginary and affective resonances and 693
registers. In his reading, Bergin implies that to ‘still res- 694
onate’ is critical to persuading and reassuring Australian 695
audiences that Mawson’s legacy is being cherished and 696
protected by the current generation of administrators and 697
scientists responsible for AAT. And thus the juxtaposition 698
with objects like polar vessels that he judged to be ‘old 699
and tired’ is notable; memories of Mawson may be ‘old’ 700
but they are not ‘tired’ because they have the capacity to 701
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be catalytic, to encourage affective ‘state-change’ and in702
this case to excite, to provoke and to be demanding.703
Using the AP as our example, three themes are used704
to illustrate how contemporary manifestations of Aus-705
tralian Antarctic nationalism pivots around relationships706
between objects, bodies and affective economies. As Eric707
Paglia (2015) noted with his argument pertaining to Sval-708
bard and the ‘tele-coupled Arctic’, there is an interesting709
relationship to be teased out between claimant states (or710
sovereign state in the case of Svalbard – Norway) and711
their relationship to other stakeholders who contribute to712
a ‘global Antarctic’. In Arctic discourse, the eight Arctic713
states have been able to position countries like China714
and India as non-Arctic states. While China has defined715
itself as a ‘near Arctic state’, its relationship to Antarctica716
is anchored in stakeholder narratives emphasising trans-717
continental environmental change, polar science and lo-718
gistics, and resource/environmental stewardship, with a719
strong interest in the current and future resource potential720
of the Antarctic region (Brady 2012).721
Australian bodies722
The Prime Ministerial foreword to the AP expresses723
the opinion that, ‘Australia has inherited a proud leg-724
acy from Sir Douglas Mawson and the generations of725
Australian Antarctic expeditioners who have followed in726
his footsteps – a legacy of heroism, scientific endeavour,727
and environmental stewardship’. As Peder Roberts has728
noted, Mawson’s association of environmental manage-729
ment with imperial authority is critical to sustaining730
and nourishing claims to Australian polar sovereignty.731
The Anglo-Australian explorer and geologist has a lot732
to answer for in this particular reading of Australian733
engagement with Antarctica and beyond because Prime734
Minister Turnbull also notes that the Mawson legacy,735
‘has forged for all Australians, a profound and significant736
connection with Antarctica’. By any reading that is quite737
a ‘claim’ to make; to perform a discursive scale-jump in738
which the actions of one man come to represent Australia739
as nation-state. While not unusual in terms the wider740
canon of imperial heroes, it is striking nonetheless to see741
such a wide claim made about the capacity of a former742
Antarctic scientist and explorer to affect, we might say,743
‘all Australians’.744
The fascination with Mawson, at least with some745
Australians, is intriguing and it is worth thinking about746
how his body (‘including his footsteps’) proves so useful747
as a geopolitical strategy? The white imperial explorer-748
hero, as other scholars have noted, such as Max Jones’ in-749
vestigation of Captain Robert Scott, prove tremendously750
productive in mobilising audiences and asking them to751
remember and to commemorate their expeditions and752
associated legacies (Jones 2003, 2014). Moreover, what753
films such as Scott of the Antarctic (1948) did was to754
‘trade’ imperial memories of polar exploration for a fable755
about heroic endurance and stoicism about the brutal756
conditions facing the party attached to the Terra Nova757
expedition (Dodds 2012). But as the complex legacy of 758
Captain Scott and more latterly Cecil Rhodes reminds us, 759
imperial heroes can also be lampooned, ridiculed and/or 760
become the objects of post-colonial anger. 761
In this case, the AP explicitly assumes that the legacy 762
of Douglas Mawson is an assured one for Australian offi- 763
cials and political leaders eager to promote and propagate 764
the idea of Antarctica as integral to the Australian nation- 765
state. Mawson and the later generation of explorers and 766
scientists such as Philip Law and the Australian Na- 767
tional Antarctic Research Expeditions (ANARE) provide 768
a seamless history of white settlement, visitors seeking to 769
not only explore and administer but also erase all traces 770
of their visitation as ‘conquest’. What could have been 771
‘awkward’ was by-passed by a form of settler colonial- 772
ism in the Antarctic, aided and abetted by objects and 773
practices designed to reassure both expedition members 774
and audiences back home. 775
The first object was rock because samples of rocks 776
and fossils played a crucial role in forging a ‘connec- 777
tion’ with Australia and Antarctica. Building a geolo- 778
gical connection enabled an imaginative and material 779
stretching and connecting of the two continents. The 780
Southern Ocean performing as a mere ‘bridge’ between 781
two continental spaces, which were inextricably linked 782
with one another. As a geologist Mawson was interested 783
in rocks and initially intrigued by the fate of rocks 784
deposited by Antarctica’s glaciers. The rock samples col- 785
lected by his expeditions also offered up something else, 786
an opportunity to assert possession over the geological 787
record of Antarctica and by association Australia. The 788
rocks were then part and parcel of the origin stories of 789
both continents, and those ‘stories’ could also be told 790
to Australian audiences. What is intriguing is how the 791
tangible objects such as rocks were, and are, capable of 792
generating affect and resonances as they are used to invite 793
later generations of Australians to imagine Mawson’s 794
enduring fascinating with Antarctica. 795
The second object of interest was, and is, the pho- 796
tograph, and the manner in which expedition members 797
have recorded their endeavours on and off the ice. While 798
books, paintings and diaries are clearly part of the media 799
ecology, the photograph has been a vital accomplice to 800
Antarctic expeditions. It served to record and to inform 801
others of the work of the expedition and was a vital ele- 802
ment in the settler colonial activities of the claimant state. 803
The formal ceremonies of possession were, wherever 804
possible, photographed. In the AP, the document is 805
littered with colour and black and white photographs 806
showing Australians past and present researching, admin- 807
istering and politicising their involvement in Antarctica. 808
One of the most significant sections of the AP deals with 809
‘Australia in Antarctica’ (and it could have also been 810
termed ‘Antarctica in Australia’); in this section we fi- 811
nally get an admission that ‘Australia asserts sovereignty 812
over 42% of the Antarctic continent - the Australian 813
Antarctic Territory . . . Australia is an original signatory 814
to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, and is staunchly committed 815
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to maintaining its strength and effectiveness’. Juxtaposed816
next to the bald statement about being a claimant are817
pictures of the 1929–1931 BANZARE expedition team818
celebrating in front of expedition huts (furnished with a819
Union flag) and an expedition member securing a plaque820
announcing the establishment of Mawson research sta-821
tion in 1954.822
The men’s bodies either with arms aloft and/or hold-823
ing a hammer seem apposite given the claims made in the824
document itself. Underwriting the history of Australian825
Antarctic expeditionary and scientific labours is an appeal826
to the corporeality of those endeavours. We are informed827
that, ‘Australians completed some of the greatest land-828
based expeditions ever made in Antarctica, traversing829
thousands of kilometres across East Antarctica’. With the830
help of other objects and bodies, such as dogs, tractors831
and aircraft, the men attached to these expeditions and832
programmes were integral to the settler colonization of833
the AAT/EA. These exclusively white and male ‘Aus-834
tralians’, as Christy Collis reminds us, were contributing835
to a history of exploration and scientific investigation836
where rock and photography were vital accomplices in837
this vast project. The images contained within the section838
on ‘Australia in Antarctica’ are those portraying men at839
work, and interestingly for all the claims about travelling840
across vast areas of East Antarctica (not the AAT/EA841
we might note) the two images are fundamentally about842
immobility and even anchorage.843
If there is ‘awkwardness’ here then it pivots around844
the gendered histories of Australia’s encounters with845
Antarctica, one in which also indigenous and other non-846
white Australians have played a very marginal role in847
the settler politics. The claim pertaining to ‘Australians’848
is a slippery one, and it is interesting to note how849
invoking the legacy of Sir Douglas Mawson contributes850
to a form of affective labour reassuring the reader that851
some Australian men have for the last hundred years852
played a substantial role in the exploration, discovery and853
settlement of AAT/EA. Unlike Scott, Mawson survives854
his polar exploration and continues to contribute to Aus-855
tralian public culture and an Australian polar station is856
named after him while he is still alive (compare Scott857
base in New Zealand’s case). What the AP is rather less858
forthcoming about is the role of other nations and their859
exploratory and scientific work in East Antarctica and860
AAT. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was a major investor861
in polar science and established bases in the AAT/EA as862
part of its contribution to the polar programme of the In-863
ternational Geophysical Year of 1957–1958. The Soviets864
famously carried out their own spectacular expeditionary865
trek across the ice in the creation of Vostok station, at the866
pole of relative inaccessibility. Latterly, other countries867
and in particular China established their own scientific868
stations including at the remote point of Dome Argus.869
One million year old ice core870
In the AP, the prospect of ‘finding’ the one million year871
old ice core is described and evaluated. It is clearly an872
exciting prospect for scientists and for those responsible 873
for managing AAT/EA. When we put Minister Hunt’s 874
presentation with the AP itself, however, there is evidence 875
of ‘awkwardness’ as the international and the national 876
rub up against one another. The international provenance 877
of the Ice Core project is acknowledged, ‘Through the 878
International Partnership in Ice Core Sciences (IPICS) 879
Australia has contributed to an array of 2,000 year old 880
ice cores across Antarctica. Some of these have helped 881
identity important climate linkages between Australia 882
and Antarctica . . . [a one million year ice core] would 883
allow us to extract a direct record of carbon dioxide and 884
see what role if any, it may have played [in shifting ice 885
age cycles]’. The IPICS involves over twenty nations 886
including the US and UK and operates in both Antarctica 887
and Greenland. It was established in 2002 and IPICS 888
aims to create a network of ice core histories (span- 889
ning 2,000 years to 40,000 years) in order to improve 890
understanding of past climates and glacial-interglacial 891
shifts. It also aims to retrieve, with relevance to Australia, 892
a one million year record from Antarctica. Scientists 893
have postulated that the ice core is likely to be sourced 894
somewhere in the East Antarctic Ice Sheet (Fischer and 895
others 2013). So the search for the ‘oldest-ice’ core, 896
therefore, is just one of a number of objectives for IPICS 897
(for a wider discussion see Elzinga 2016). 898
There was another awkward moment, however, that 899
emerged at a conference hosted by Australia on the work 900
of IPICS in March 2016. Hosted by the Australian Ant- 901
arctic Division and the Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems 902
Cooperative Research Centre, media reporting noted that 903
an Australian scientific organisation, the Commonwealth 904
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 905
was preparing for job losses with climate research bear- 906
ing the brunt of the downsizing. Media reporting of the 907
initial announcement in February had been damning of 908
the organisation and an open letter signed by nearly 909
3,000 scientists condemned ‘The recent announcement 910
of devastating cuts to the Australian CSIRO’s Oceans 911
and Atmosphere research program [which] has alarmed 912
the global climate research community. The decision to 913
decimate a vibrant and world-leading research program 914
shows a lack of insight, and a misunderstanding of the 915
importance of the depth and significance of Australian 916
contributions to global and regional climate research. The 917
capacity of Australia to assess future risks and plan for 918
climate change adaptation crucially depends on maintain- 919
ing and augmenting this research capacity’ (Open Letter 920
to Australian Government 2016). 921
The rationale was underpinned by a neoliberal vis- 922
ion of industrial collaboration and commercialisation 923
of science. The decision to cut and re-purpose came 924
in the wake of budget cuts, earlier staff losses and a 925
new chief executive hired from the United States with 926
a background in digital technology. The new chief ex- 927
ecutive, Larry Marshall, later admitted in the Australian 928
Senate that the proposed job cuts at CSIRO and the 929
loss of climate researchers had been badly handled (The 930
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Guardian 2016). Internal memos from senior CSIRO931
staff suggest an organisation struggling over a number932
of years to reconcile public service science with the933
pressures imposed by national government and a broader934
trend towards the privatised science regime (Mirowski935
2011).936
Marshall’s public awkwardness was made manifest in937
the public scrutiny that followed. How critics contended938
could a leading scientific body make 275 job cuts in939
the aftermath of the 2015 Paris Climate Change talks?940
The decision to announce that Hobart would host a941
new national climate research centre employing some 40942
people was welcomed but widely thought to be rather943
modest and opportunistic given the government’s desire944
to concentrate activity in Hobart as premier polar gate-945
way. But what is perhaps notable is the manner in which946
climate change science is still being put to work here in947
terms of demonstrating polar engagement. As a report948
in Nature noted, the new centre was not going to do949
much to shift the perceived severity of the original cuts950
themselves:951
Opposition to CSIRO’s cuts, the result of a stra-952
tegic shift away from basic climate science, has953
been strong. Almost 3,000 scientists have signed an954
open letter [sent in February 2016] to CSIRO and955
to Australia’s government, raising concerns over the956
effects of the move on the nation’s climate research957
capacity. Rallies have been held in major Australian958
cities, and CSIRO management has been questioned959
by the Australian senate about its decision, as part of960
an on-going inquiry scrutinizing government budget961
cuts (Gough 2016).962
The materiality of Antarctic ice is clearly significant963
because the core and the process of coring offers up964
something rather tantalising to Australian audiences. The965
prospect of drilling through Antarctic ice and reading not966
only further into deep geologic time but using the past to967
read off possible futures. As the drill pushes through the968
ice, one senses from the AP that Australia’s geophysical969
and geopolitical connection to the continent deepens.970
And as Minister Hunt noted in his presentation this is971
what makes the Ice Core project intrinsically exciting:972
Beyond that, science is a key national interest. This973
funding today, and this strategy helps us in the search974
for the million-year ice core. This is one of the world’s975
great scientific endeavours, and it is likely, on the976
advice I have from Dr Nick Gales and other scientists977
within AAD, that if the ice core is to be found, it978
will be found in Australia’s Antarctic Territory (Hunt979
2016).980
Australia can thus claim a nationalised provenance981
over one million years of planetary history; thanks to a982
possible accident of geography, law, history and politics.983
The ground zero of ice core dating ‘belongs’ to Australia984
and by association a connection to Antarctica that goes985
far beyond the one invoked by the Prime Minister in his986
foreword to the AP when he noted, ‘Mawson’s legacy987
has forged, for all Australians, a profound and significant988
connection with Antarctica. The Australian Antarctic 989
Territory occupies a unique place in our national iden- 990
tity’. It remains a moot point about whether this is indeed 991
felt by most Australians and the Prime Minister offers 992
no evidence for such a claim. Finding the one million 993
year ice core in the AAT might be more likely when one 994
claims over 40% of the polar continent but it also resur- 995
rects, by accident, a previous Australian encounter with 996
India over the possible location of a research station in 997
East Antarctica. Jessica O’Reilly dissected that particular 998
encounter, and showed how India’s claims to a geological 999
connection with Antarctica (via the history of Gondwana- 1000
land some 125 million years ago) can cause problems 1001
in nationalising narratives on the part of claimant states 1002
(O’Reilly 2011). 1003
Australian attempts to nationalise the one million year 1004
old ice core are awkward however. In May 2015, The 1005
New York Times reported under the banner of ‘China, 1006
pursuing strategic interests, builds presence in Antarc- 1007
tica’ that Australia and China were collaborating with one 1008
another through the gateway of Hobart and that, ‘China 1009
is betting it has found the best location to drill, at an 1010
area called Dome A, or Dome Argus, the highest point 1011
on the East Antarctic Ice Sheet. Though it is considered 1012
one of the coldest places on the planet, with temperat- 1013
ures of 130 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, a Chinese 1014
expedition explored the area in 2005 and established a 1015
research station in 2009’ (The New York Times 2015). 1016
In other words, the report suggested that there might 1017
be a ‘race’ between China and Australia to see who 1018
could obtain the first one million year old ice core. 1019
And one could imagine that China would refer to East 1020
Antarctica as the source area not AAT. Beyond that, 1021
ice core recovery work, interpretation and analysis is a 1022
multi-national affair, as other consortia around Vostok, 1023
Dome C, Dome Fuji and Lake Ellsworth remind us 1024
(more generally, Elzinga 2016). British academics, such 1025
as Lewis and Maslin, have recently put to use the Law 1026
Dome core to raise an argument regarding the onset 1027
of the Anthropocene being initiated with the European 1028
colonisation of South America (Lewis and Maslin 1029
2015). 1030
For scholars of Antarctica, recent writings on the 1031
more than human/non-human offer potentially rich pick- 1032
ings to interrogate further the manner in which objects 1033
such as the ice core are entangled in sovereignty projects. 1034
The ice core in this reading become not an inert object but 1035
something more active; a lively subject communicating 1036
across time and space with a variety of audiences. In 1037
so doing, it also raises to the fore awkward encounters 1038
for claimant states such as Australia in terms of how 1039
the planetary history of the Earth becomes embedded in 1040
nationalist narratives and practices including images of 1041
Australian hands holding ice core drilling equipment and 1042
the role of Australian institutions in storing and archiving 1043
the 2,000 year old ice cores. While it might well be so 1044
that Australian hands are the dominant form of agency 1045
here, the ice itself might prove ‘disobedient’ and even 1046
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awkward as it potentially evades Australian discovery1047
and/or reveals how ice cores archive past Australian1048
encounters with the carbon age through the use of leaded1049
petrol from the inter-war period to the 1970s (Wolff and1050
Suttie 1994).1051
Hobart as hub1052
Hobart as a gateway to Antarctica or ‘hub’ in Australian1053
Antarctic parlance has been a long time in the making1054
and is saturated with sovereignty politics (Elzinga 2013).1055
As a point of departure and arrival of Antarctic voyages,1056
the port-city enjoys a considerable historical provenance.1057
The city’s historical connections with Antarctica and the1058
Southern Ocean have been interrogated in the aftermath1059
of news that a replica of ‘Mawson’s hut’ has been added1060
to an expanding portfolio of polar tourist attractions,1061
which opens up an awkward encounter between Aus-1062
tralia’s role as colonial settler power in the Antarctic with1063
a more trans-national reading of Hobart as a gathering1064
point for a more international encounter with Antarctica1065
(Leane and others 2016). As Elle Leane and colleagues1066
reflect, ‘Mawson’s hut frames touristic encounters around1067
highly familiar national and urban narratives, which un-1068
derpin much heritage discourse today . . . What becomes1069
lost in such a framing is the opportunity to elevate the1070
hut and the heritage-scape surrounding it to a space1071
associated with the internationalism of Antarctica. Gov-1072
ernance and cooperation in the region continues to be1073
shaped by a complex and ambiguous political dynamic.1074
Seven countries claim territorial rights, with certain areas1075
subject to contestation from overlapping claims. The pre-1076
cariousness of this structure is complicated by Russia’s1077
and the United States’ refusal to recognise the seven1078
existing claims (while reserving the right to make their1079
own), and the increasing involvement of comparatively1080
new Antarctic players such as India and China’ (Leane1081
and others 2016: 223).1082
The AP highlights the crucial role of Hobart as the1083
home of the Australian Antarctic Division and gateway1084
to East Antarctica more generally and not just AAT (Fig.1085
3.). As Minister Hunt noted, ‘And then last of all we have1086
the economic, and growth and jobs benefits to Hobart1087
and Tasmania, Hobart being the global gateway to the1088
Antarctic. This is about science jobs, education jobs, it’s1089
about logistical jobs, it’s about the attraction of Hobart1090
as a world class visiting point for the creation of climate1091
science, of environmental science, of Antarctic science1092
and for people to participate in that’. The Tasmanian1093
government has also been swift to promote the port as1094
a ‘natural gateway’ to ‘East Antarctica and the Southern1095
Ocean and Macquarie Island with excellent port facilities1096
and regular flights to Antarctica’. Hobart has also ac-1097
quired a track record of acting as a logistical hub for other1098
national Antarctic programmes including France, Russia1099
and China but that is anything but ‘natural’. To assume1100
any form of naturalness would be for any ‘awkwardness’1101
about being a widely unrecognised claimant state to1102
be wished away by making a virtue of the point of 1103
departure (Hobart) rather than the point of arrival (East 1104
Antarctica/AAT). 1105
The choice of ‘East Antarctica’ as geographical de- 1106
scription is a deliberate one designed to avoid further 1107
‘awkwardness’ in respect of those international partners 1108
who do not recognise AAT. It also refers to an even 1109
more extensive part of the Antarctic continent than the 1110
AAT itself, so paradoxically ends up being expansionist 1111
in remit and even ‘demanding’ of further Australian infra- 1112
structural investment such an ice runway at Casey station. 1113
The East Antarctic Shield for, example, encompasses 1114
over 70% of the continent compared to 42%, as repres- 1115
ented by the AAT. Encompassing the East Antarctic Ice 1116
Sheet, the shield area has as its heart the aptly named 1117
Mawson craton, an extensive yet geological stable area of 1118
the continental interior. But this huge area, including the 1119
AAT, is also one that worries some Australian political 1120
commentators. Writing in the Sydney Morning Herald, 1121
Anthony Bergin is more forthcoming that the Action Plan 1122
about the dangers involved in facilitating the access of 1123
others to East Antarctica: 1124
The strategy talks about being a logistics collab- 1125
orator of choice in East Antarctica. But it fails to 1126
acknowledge the importance of our search and rescue 1127
responsibilities. As we, and other Antarctic nations, 1128
enhance their polar programs, with more personnel 1129
and greater coverage of land and marine activities, 1130
the risk of SAR incidences will increase in this harsh 1131
environment. 1132
The strategy sensibly focuses on the importance of 1133
our work in the East Antarctic region. That’s congru- 1134
ent with our core interest of sovereignty over our Ant- 1135
arctic territory. But we should avoid any perception 1136
that we’re focused only on those waters surround- 1137
ing our sub-Antarctic territories and our Antarctic 1138
territory. 1139
Where to from here? If we’re fair dinkum about 1140
pursuing our Antarctic interests, we need to be active 1141
in Antarctica. But our present capability means we 1142
can’t match what others are doing in our territory, let 1143
alone lead (Bergin 2016). 1144
What the discourses and practices associated with 1145
Hobart as hub in the AP and elsewhere reveal is how 1146
the appeal to the gateway/hub functions in two inter- 1147
related ways. First, as a national gateway for Australia 1148
and Australian possessions in the Southern Ocean and 1149
AAT; second, as a node for the performance of national 1150
authority over others through legal and administrative 1151
measures associated with air and sea-port state juris- 1152
diction; and third, as a site for extracting profit from 1153
being an international hub for the polar operations of 1154
others. It is also an essential element in the formal 1155
architecture of the Antarctic Treaty System. Hobart is 1156
not only the headquarters for the Commission for the 1157
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 1158
Living Resources (CCAMLR) but also the place in which 1159
Australia presents its Antarctic and Southern Ocean 1160
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interests. As the Tasmanian government notes it is the1161
‘perfect gateway’ because:1162
Hobart provides natural access to the Southern Ocean,1163
sub-Antarctic Macquarie Island and the vast East Ant-1164
arctic region. It is the logical resupply point for East1165
Antarctic stations and bases. Tasmania is the power-1166
house driving Australia’s activities in Antarctica, the1167
sub-Antarctic islands and the Southern Ocean. It is1168
the preferred location for Australia’s assets relating1169
to the Antarctic, with more than 830 Tasmanians1170
employed in science, research and polar support activ-1171
ities. Hobart is recognised around the world as one1172
of five Antarctic gateway cities, with direct air and1173
sea access to East Antarctica. The combination of1174
expert polar businesses and infrastructure servicing1175
Antarctic expeditions and our hub of scientific expert-1176
ise, makes Hobart unique among the gateway cities1177
(Tasmanian Government 2014).1178
The notion of ‘perfection’ in this case is interesting1179
because the sales pitch by both the Tasmanian govern-1180
ment and the federal Australian government revolves1181
around creating a double win. So while there may be1182
economic gain for the state of Tasmania and geopolitical1183
gain for the federal government, it might be tempered1184
by the realisation that countries such as China threaten1185
to expose Australia as an effective claimant state. As he1186
contends, ‘If we’re not a big player in Antarctic affairs1187
then our polar agenda will be driven by others. There’s1188
now, for example, a risk of being left behind by China.1189
China’s setting up its first air squadron in Antarctica this1190
year. Last year it announced it was preparing to build1191
a fifth research station on the continent’ (Bergin 2016).1192
Even if both state and federal level government actors1193
are working to extract profit and prestige from relative1194
geographical proximity to Antarctica, others appear to be1195
building things, flying things and simply doing things that1196
imperil the settler colonial project in AAT/East Antarc-1197
tica. Even if sovereignty claims are held in abeyance and1198
one enjoys the right of inspection under the terms of the1199
Antarctic Treaty, Bergin’s comments resurrect something1200
that the current legal, scientific and political architecture1201
(inspired by the IGY 1957–1958) cannot resolve, what1202
one does and how one feels about the activities of others1203
are two different things.1204
For claimant states such as Australia and New Zea-1205
land, ‘hub-talk’ had become one way of reconciling1206
certain squeamishness about sovereignty and stewardship1207
in Antarctica. Under an explicitly neo-liberal rubric,1208
claimant/gateway states leverage and recast their geo-1209
graphical proximity in a way that allows them to make1210
financial and geopolitical capital. In the past, proxim-1211
ity was used to advance sovereignty projects but now1212
geography is being made to pay in other ways. New1213
Zealand has a similar strategy with its promotion of1214
Christchurch as a gateway for other operators including1215
the United States and Italy (note Gateway Antarctica at1216
the University of Canterbury in Christchurch). When the1217
Chinese leader Xi Jingping visited in November 2014, the1218
Chinese icebreaker Snow Dragon was berthed in Hobart 1219
harbour and became part of the official visit. President 1220
Xi’s visit, while predominantly focussed around energy 1221
projects in the island state, became an opportunity for 1222
both Australia and China to engage in Antarctic hub 1223
geopolitics. The two countries’ leaders signed a bilateral 1224
agreement, which in essence confirmed Hobart as China’s 1225
preferred Antarctic gateway. But it was done so on a 1226
Chinese ship. The Tasmanian premier, Will Hodgman, 1227
noted at the time of the agreement: 1228
Tasmania and China have collaborated in Antarc- 1229
tica for the past 30-years and this agreement will 1230
strengthen our friendship with China while also 1231
providing a boost to the Tasmanian economy. The 1232
Antarctic sector makes a significant contribution to 1233
the state’s economy, contributing more than $187 1234
million each year and directly employing around 1235
1,185 people, with Tasmanian businesses providing 1236
specialised cold climate goods and services, food and 1237
shipping supplies and fuel for ships and stations. 1238
Today is an important milestone for Chinese and 1239
Tasmanian Antarctic friendship and we look forward 1240
to a productive relationship into the future (Hodgman 1241
2014). 1242
The signing ceremony took place on Snow Dragon, 1243
the same ship that, earlier in the year, helped rescue the 1244
‘Spirit of Mawson’ expedition: an Australian led enter- 1245
prise designed to recreate some of the scientific work 1246
carried out decades earlier by Mawson and his expedition 1247
members. Unfortunately for the more recent expedition, 1248
their ship became trapped in sea ice and the helicopter 1249
attached to Snow Dragon played an important role in 1250
affecting a rescue of the non-essential crew members. 1251
Occasionally, however, ‘hub-talk’ does not offer quite 1252
the reassurance that is intended to Tasmanian and Aus- 1253
tralian audiences. With the emphasis on trade, science 1254
and logistical cooperation in Antarctic operations, a great 1255
deal of affective investment has been made by Australian 1256
stakeholders to reassure local and national communities 1257
that China’s role is either geopolitically benign and/or 1258
commercially advantageous. In their piece for The Con- 1259
versation, Indi Hodgson-Johnston and Julia Jabour ask at 1260
the end ‘Is the AAT under threat?’ They ask an awkward 1261
question that premiers and prime ministers in Hobart 1262
and Canberra do not want to articulate. As part of the 1263
preamble to their intervention, they note that, ‘The issue 1264
was raised this this week with claims that Australian re- 1265
searchers should have been deployed to study an issue at 1266
the Totten Glacier, just 400km from the Australian Casey 1267
base. Instead, a US mission had been sent, ironically via 1268
Hobart. Faced with growing interest in the region from 1269
other nations such as China, South Korea, India, Russia 1270
and Iran, there was a call for an extra A$10-20 mil- 1271
lion a year in Australian Antarctic research’ (Hodgson- 1272
Johnston and Jabour 2014, my emphasis). The keyword 1273
is ‘ironically’ because they use it, I think, to alert the 1274
reader to the apparently unexpected or even paradoxical 1275
occurrence of either a US mission departing from an 1276
‘AWKWARD ANTARCTIC NATIONALISM’ 13
Australian port-city (as opposed to departing from a New1277
Zealand port) and/or a US mission that did the work an1278
Australian team should have done because the glacier in1279
question was only 400km away from an Australian re-1280
search station. Either way, the Americans used Australia1281
as a gateway and in effect exposed Australia failure to1282
use its gateway to further its geopolitical and scientific1283
interests. They then use that example to extrapolate and1284
warn readers that a whole series of predominantly Asian1285
states are also showing signs of ‘growing interest’ in the1286
region (which is shorthand for AAT).1287
When answering their question ‘Is the AAT under1288
threat?’ they conclude with the following piece of prose1289
invested with a form of affective labour:1290
In the most unlikely event that the Treaty should1291
end, then any rival claimant will need to submit to a1292
competitive process with Australia, bettering its long1293
standing history of effective occupation. Broader,1294
untested arguments of common heritage aside, it is1295
unlikely that another country could defeat Australia’s1296
claim. We should acknowledge and celebrate the con-1297
sistently peaceful intentions embodied in the Treaty1298
and associated activities of other countries within the1299
AAT. Article IV makes the discourse of fear of other1300
countries’ presence on Australia’s territory a moot1301
point (Hodgson-Johnston and Jabour 2014).1302
Their article is thus designed to reassure the assumed1303
Australian reader that Australia and specifically Hobart1304
acting as a ‘hub’ for others is not jeopardising Australia’s1305
sovereignty over the AAT. They articulate the awkward1306
question and find an answer that offers reassurance.1307
Australia’s long record of ‘effective occupation’ means1308
that settler colonial project is well established. Australia1309
has had over 80 years of settler history in general to1310
perfect its title to Antarctic territory and the AP is keen1311
to remind readers of that. The people and things that1312
pass through gateways such as Hobart are reinforcing1313
that sense of entitlement and in the process supporting1314
Tasmania as the ‘natural gateway’.1315
But the thing about hubs and gateways is that they1316
also end up supporting the counter-sovereignty projects1317
of others. In the 1950s, Australian and New Zealand1318
governments worried about Soviet vessels using their1319
ports while establishing their IGY Antarctic programme1320
(Gan 2009). As Irina Gan has shown, the Soviets had1321
no intention of leaving Antarctica despite speculation in1322
Australia and elsewhere about the long-term interests of1323
the Soviet Union. In an era characterised by rampant1324
anti-communism and poor Australian-Soviet relations,1325
Australia under Prime Minister Robert Menzies’ lead-1326
ership felt pressurised into offering their port facilities1327
to the IGY Soviet programme. The Soviet vessel Lena1328
used the facilities at Port Adelaide before leaving for1329
Antarctica in March 1956 and the Australian government1330
was pressurised by the UK and the US into accepting1331
its presence. Douglas Mawson was one of the first to1332
visit the Lena and later the ship Ob also arrived at1333
Port Adelaide. In each case, Mawson was central in the1334
welcoming party but he also embodied controversy when 1335
it became clear the Menzies government tried to extract 1336
some form of recognition from the Soviet Union that they 1337
were travelling towards the AAT. The crew of Ob were 1338
also invited by the Australia-USSR Friendship Society to 1339
visit other Australian cities but the federal government 1340
vetoed this proposal on the basis of the security risk 1341
the crew and the vessel posed. As is well known, this 1342
awkward encounter did not produce a desirable outcome 1343
for Australia; the Soviet Union did not acknowledge 1344
Australian sovereignty and they continued in the event 1345
to use Australia’s port facilities, as would have been 1346
expected given the prevailing ethos of the IGY and later 1347
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. They also established the bulk 1348
of their IGY Antarctic programme in the AAT and have 1349
never left. 1350
Conclusion 1351
Anthony Bergin writing in the aftermath of the release 1352
of the AP told his readers that, ‘We sometimes forget 1353
that we assert sovereignty over 42 per cent of the Ant- 1354
arctic continent, roughly the size of mainland Australia 1355
minus Queensland’ (Bergin 2016). He certainly was not 1356
referring to himself in the category of ‘we’. He has been 1357
a passionate advocate of Australia’s occupation of Ant- 1358
arctica. For him and others, there are a constellation of 1359
objects, humans and affective resonances that can and do 1360
get assembled in order to ensure that Australia does more 1361
to ensure that its interests and rights are protected. The 1362
constellations themselves are multiple, complex, mobile 1363
and dynamic and include infrastructure, proclamations, 1364
APs, ceremonies of remembrance, information papers to 1365
the Antarctic Treaty System, hosting others in places like 1366
Hobart and the like. Sometimes words fail to move us, 1367
and sometimes objects behave in a disobedient manner 1368
such as when sea ice traps an Australian led expedition 1369
(‘The Spirit of Mawson’) in Antarctica, which then has 1370
to be rescued by a Chinese polar vessel. Longer-term, 1371
China’s scientific and logistical investment in Antarctica 1372
(and the Arctic) reveal interesting insights into how 1373
that country positions itself as a pre-eminent stakeholder 1374
(Brady 2016) and ice core research is a constant reminder 1375
of how a great many stakeholders intersect with one 1376
another. 1377
The exploration here of Australian Antarctic nation- 1378
alism is by no means comprehensive but one designed 1379
to open up debate. The term awkward is intended to 1380
be provocative; to catalyse on moments of unease and 1381
anxiety so that it might be possible to better understand 1382
contemporary manifestations of Antarctic nationalism in 1383
the light of commentaries, which warn of growing tension 1384
over the future of Antarctica in terms of fisheries manage- 1385
ment, resource allocation and the relationship with envir- 1386
onmental protection, and the commercial exploitation of 1387
the biological life of Antarctica. In the spirit of Michel 1388
Foucault, we might conclude by saying that Antarctic 1389
nationalisms, while not unique, perhaps reveal most 1390
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clearly the inter-relationship between sovereignty, secur-1391
ity and circulation. With sovereignty being about exer-1392
cising authority within a territory, security being about1393
managing uncertainty and circulation being preoccupied1394
with wanted and unwanted forms of mobility. What1395
we might say about contemporary Australian Antarctic1396
nationalism is that government ministers, journalists and1397
academics desperately seek to avoid awkward encounters1398
with others, and strive to assemble and enroll objects,1399
peoples, sites and ideas conducive to the continued claim-1400
ing and occupation of 42% of Antarctica. It is a tall, wide1401
and deep task and one that relies upon a degree of control1402
that is always going to be elusive and paradoxically ends1403
up producing the very awkwardness it seeks to avoid. But1404
it is not one unique to Australia even if it remains the1405
largest claimant state in Antarctica.1406
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